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Annual Banquet
February22, 1928
The annual banquet of this Association
will be held Wednesday evening, February
22, 1928, at the University Club, at 7 P. M.
The Hon. Silas H. Strawn, President of
the American Bar Association, will speak.
Dress will be formal.
The price of tickets and other details will
be given in a later notice.
The Committee is making L, special effort
to have an entertaining program with special
amusement features, and a large attendance is
desired.
Mr. Gould, Secretary of this Association,
will have charge of the distribution of the
tickets. The office buildings will be canvassed, and the services of about twenty
younger members of the Association are desired in this connection. Anyone willing to
assist in the sale of these tickets is requested
to communicate with Mr. Gould, 517 Symes
Bldg., Main 5715.
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JanuaryMeeting
to order by President Stearns
HE regular meeting was called
on January 12th, 1928, in the
Chamber of Commerce Building, at
12:45 P.M.
Mr. Clyde Barker, Chairman of the
Special Committee appointed for consideration of feasibility of publication
of digests of the Colorado Supreme
Court, reporting for the Committee,
stated that two plans for the publication of these Digests had been considered. The first, to have the Clerk
of the Supreme Court publish these
digests at regular intervals; the second, to have a Committee of the Bar
Association take care of these digests
each month as a part of the Bar Association Record. Mr. Barker highly
recommended the second plan in that
it would cost the members of the Bar
nothing for this service and would also

make the Record a far more valuable
publication.
Mr. Edward Knowles, Chairman of
the Annual Banquet Committee, reported the annual banquet would be
held at the University Club on February 22nd, the speaker of the evening
being the Hon. Silas H. Strawn, President of the American Bar Association.
Mr. Knowles further stated that there
would be other entertainment at the
banquet and not more than one other
speaker.
President Stearns before calling on
Mr. Cherrington stated that he at least
had always considered the subject of
political science as a shifting proposition and was reminded, in considering
this subject, of a statement made
quite recently by a friend of his; that
"he did not know whether we were at
the present time learning more and
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more about less and less or less and
less about more and more". He then
introduced Mr. Ben Cherrington, Executive Secretary of the Foundation
for the Advancement of the Social
Sciences of the University of Denver,
under whose auspices the speaker, Dr.
James T. Shotwell, was present.
Mr. Cherrington stated that the
name "Dr. James T. Shotwell, Professor of History", appears in the Columbia University catalogue, and described Dr. Shotwell as more or less of a
war casualty, he having been taken
to Paris by President Wilson at the
time the Treaty of Versailles was
drawn up and having lived in Europe
practically continuously since the war
writing a history of the war which is
unique in that it attempts to present
the effect war has upon the people of
the countries involved, their governments and their living conditions. A
committee of 200 European statesmen
with offices in every European country
save Spain are helping Dr. Shotwell
in this work, and 100 volumes have
been written at the present time, while
100 more volumes are being prepared,
and the end is not yet in sight. Stating that no one could speak with morE
authority upon European aftairs than
the day's speaker, he introduced Dr.
Shotwell.
Prefacing his speech with the remark
that he came before the meeting as
a historian and not as a partisan, and
wanted to briefly analyze the history
of the League of Nations from a historical standpoint, Dr. Shotwell stated
that in the controversies in this country about the League of Nations and
the World Court, we have passed from
partisanship to legalistic arguments
and that he for one deplored the situation which exists in America where
the people of a country as a whole
are trying to pass amateur legal opinions on technical questions, such as
are involved in a discussion of the
League of Nations, when they should

be discussing first, what the League of
Nations has been up to, and second,
its construction.
The structure of the League as it is
working in practice at the present
time is far different from the original
plans for the League which provided
for the Assembly, the Council and the
Secretariat, which were to be of im
portance in the order named, but now
that the League was actually in operation, the order of importance of the
different branches was just reversed.
Taking up the Secretariat, Dr- Shotwell pointed out that originally it was
planned to have this Department function all of the time, but it was to be
as unimportant as possible in order
to keep away from international bureaucracy. At the present time, under
enlightened guidance, they have gathered together experts of the highest
calibre in all types of public service
to work in Geneva, and to coordinate
the efforts of a growing world community. A peculiar situation with regard to these experts is that most of
them have higher reputations in other
countries than they have in their own,
this being the chief source of weakness in the Secretariat, in that the
members are thought not to pay as
much attention to their own country's
welfare as their fellow-countrymen
think they should. This grouping together of experts has however had
one very beneficial result, in that the
smaller states have for the first time
in their history the highest degree of
technical skill available at their disposal. Reciting as an example the
Danube Valley situation, over which
Austria and Hungary could never formerly agree:
In former days it was
the usual state of affairs that once
freight cars went across this boundary, they were never returned, making it necessary for the shipper at the
boundary line to unload from the cars
of one country and reload his goods
upon the cars of the other country;
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this and other controversies have been
amicably settled by the technical experts of the Secretariat who lacked
any prejudices. Now, owing to the
work of the Secretariat, there is a
sense of respect for its work, that
might be termed "the decencies of international intercourse". The Secretariat performs most of the technical
work of the League and rarely deals
with political questions and then, only
under specific directions from the
council, which is chiefly concerned
with this phase of the work.
Taking up this branch of the League,
Dr. Shotwell pointed out that in the
League Covenant it was not intended
that the Council was to meet oftener
than once each year, but ever since its
inception it has met at least four times
each year and at the present time the
smaller nations are protesting against
this number of meetings of the Counciland desire instead that these gatherings be held more often because
these smaller states fear the secret
diplomacy of the larger powers. The
Council has developed into meetings
of the Foreign Ministers, who are responsible for the foreign policy of
their nations.
Dr. Shotwell stated
that in his opinion the meetings of the
Council are a great gain over prewar
diplomacy.
Formerly, the nations
wrote notes to each other and the
different foreign Ministers would be
corresponding with other Ministers
whom they had never even seen. These
notes often went unanswered for long
periods of time, but now the foreign
ministers meet together and there is
no formal note writing from one to
the other, with the result that there
is no accumulation of public sentiment, extorted by the newspapers in
their respective nations, while they
are awaiting a reply from some other
country. The Council brings the note
writers together in meetings and they
now have confidence in each other.
They call each other "Colleague", and
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Britain, Germany and France have retained their Foreign Ministers, no
matter what political faction happened to be in power at home. This is
due, not primarily to the fact that the
people at home have confidence in
their respective foreign ministers, but
because the other countries do, and
while the representatives of the larger
powers have conferences, the smaller
ones are present and listen in on these
meetings.
In Dr. Shotwell's opinion, the Council is the best place to settle political
disputes, as the Council is not a court
where a judgment can le rendered
and hence a compromise is reached
more easily in the Council than in the
world court, as people speak more
freely when a judgment cannot be
rendered, and they are under no compulsion to reach any definite conclusion. Dr. Shotwell brought out that
any dispute was a political question
up to the point where a compromise
is reached or a definite issue is to be
settled, then it becomes a juridical
question for determination in a court
of law such as The World Court provided for in the League; and he further stated that these disputes did not
usually go to the World Court for a
final trial and judgment.
As an example of the political questions settled by the Council, he cited
the "Saare Valley question".
Over
this territory, which lies on the border
of Alsace-Lorraine, France has been
given a mandate of fifteen years to
exploit the coal mines in this region.
in return for the coal property lost
during the war. It seems that France
had cut their military force in this
area from 800 to 300 soldiers. At the
next meeting of the Council the German Minister was to preside for the
first time and because of this the
German papers were demanding that
France cut their military force still
further because it would be a showing
of bad faith if this were not done. At
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the same time, the French papers in
commenting on the situation, were
quite strong in stating that France
should not be intimidated by what
they called a "German bluff". This
was a political question and after a
long discussion, it was finally settled
in the Council by the Italian representative, who said he thought France
could have 800 soldiers in the region
if they did not use them. This humorous remark concluded a very serious controversy to the apparent satisfaction of all concerned.
The Assembly is the Parliament of
the Nations, and it never gets beyond
the preparation and discussion of
world affairs. Its matters of importance are usually referred to a commission.

The commissions of the League are
summoned to meet from time to time
to deal with specific problems and Dr.
Shotwell said at this point that there
was not a week in the year during
which some commission was not holding a meeting, discussing some national problem, something unheard of
before the war.
In conclusion, Dr. Shotwell said that
as first planned, the League was only
for the purpose of averting wars, but
that due to the way the League had
functioned, it was going to succeed
because of.the world interest in building up human contacts and a world
community.
B&M.

Martial Law in Colorado
(Address delivered before The Law Club, Jan. 25, 1928,
By Frazer Arnold, of the Denver Bar.)

oppose organized government
RGANIZATIONS
or societies
to
have existed continuously
from
the Middle Ages to the present day.
The first anarchist is said to have
been Zeno the Stoic. He represented
a group of philosophers opposed to
the ideas of the State as elaborated by
Plato.
In 19th and 20th Century despotisms, organizations to oppose government generally, have claimed a large
share of the talent and energy of the
revolutionary movement, especially
among the youth. The cruelties and
stupidities of their government excited
fiery indignation against the only
State with which they were familiar.
It has been characteristic of the Russian and German temperament, especially, that it will work out comprehensive systems of philosophy to harmonize all society and all life with

some rather narrow conclusion. This
is done with a laboriousness and a
plausibility that are amazing. With
the criminality of their own government immutably fixed in mind, they
evolve systems which demonstrate
that the governments of France, the
United States and all other modern
republics are practically as bad as any
other form of the State. They very
early, in any revolution, break with
the Constitutional Democrats, whom
they regard as obstructionists to a
realization of their dreams, and whom
they persecute relentlessly whenever
they get in power. This is the normal
course of all European revolutions:
of the First Revolution in France, the
upheavals on the continent in 1848,
the Paris Commune Interlude of 1871,
and the events in Russia, Austria and
Hungary in 1917, '18 and '19.
The anarchists have had their share
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of geniuses, among them such brilliant
and attractive writers as Bakunin,
Proudhon, and Prince Kropotkin; and
it is not hard to understand their influence upon the young of certain
European countries. In America, however, their proselytes are generally
those of defective education, individuals with a flair for wild theory, victims of academic seclusion, and others
with no knowledge or practical experience in business, administration
or law.
It is needless to say that not every
radical organization is illegal. A perfect right exists to change our system
of government and society by methods
provided in our Constitution, and to
advocate such change by constitutional methods, regardless of the impolicy or folly of the change advocated. We are here dealing only with
radicalism which seeks to enforce its
demands by violence.
Such societies are declared unlawful by Sec. 6655 of our Compiled Laws,
and the next section makes participation in their activities a felony.
A few years ago the danger of extreme radicalism seemed to lie in the
labor unions, but of late years wiser
counsels have prevailed there. Today
the extreme radicals get more comfort in institutions of higher learning,
universities
and theological seminaries.
In an attempt to gauge the problem
in America, for executive purposes,
our Federal Government a few years
ago made surveys of the extreme radical man power in this country, with
the following conclusion:
In extreme radical
organizations .......... 380,000
Radical members of
semi-radical organizations ........................ 322,000
Non-enrolled adherents
of the above groups..200,000
Total of this type-,-- 902,000
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Elements which experience has shown are
likely to join in wherever disturbances occur:
(1) Unorganized aliens 40,000
(2) Unorganized criminals ................................
50,000
(3) Other uncertain
and
hoodlum
elem ents ........................ 50,000
Total of this kind._..
Grand total ......

140,000
1,042,000

Extreme radical groups are, as a
rule, loosely organized, the leaders inefficient and unreliable, and the members undisciplined.
All p6sess or
could easily procure small arms, uch
as rifles, pistols, revolvers, shotguns
and bombs. Very few will be found
in their ranks who have had military
training or experience.
Most of our disturbances are industrial and local, although, as at present,
they usually draw their leadership and
inspiration from the anarchist-communist societies, whose aims are not
local or economic but political and
revolutionary. I do not suppose that
the violent radicals are any more numerous now than in 1920; but that
does not mean that we shall not continue to have violent disturbances
from time to time, for as long a period as any of us shall remain on the
scene.
Eighty years have rolled by since
Karl Marx issued his Communist Manifesto calling upon the workers of the
world to unite and overthrow bourgeois society, yet the proletarian revolution seems as far away in Western
Europe and America as it did then.
Nevertheless our republic is only a
century and a half old, which is nothing, compared with the great empires
of history, and there is no predicting
what may be ahead in the none too
remote future.
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At present the I. W. W. is the most
formidable organization for violent
disturbance, and the Industrial and
economic effects of its activities are
great and baneful. Its leaders have
mapped the country, showing the various so-called "sympathetic areas".
Wherever a state constabulary is nonexistent or hastily organized, or the
local executives are wavering or sympathetic, or the courts are believed to
be equivocal in their doctrines, there
do these goshawks and turkey buzzards of "direct action" wing their
way.
The truth is that in no modern country, except in the Confederate States
during t~eir brief existence, have
there been so many instances of civil
dist~irbance, demanding the executive
remedy of Martial Rule, as in the
United States. And nowhere (that I
know of-) have the legal rules and
principles defining and explaining that
extreme remedy been better or more
clearly stated.
Martial Law is the child of necessity and is not peculiar to any nation
or type of nation. In Continental Europe it is called the state of siege.
It exists and has always existed in
England, although some attempt was
formerly made to disguise it with fictions, and to treat it as an illegal exercise of power, to be followed and
justified by parliamentary acts of indemnity. In this country it has been
invoked at all periods of our history,
and by executives of every school of
opinion. Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Jackson, Tyler, Lincoln, Johnson, Grant, Cleveland, McKinley, Wilson, Coolidge, all found it necessary
to use the remedy, either in strict or
qualified form, during their respective
terms of office, as President or as Governor of a State, or both. Nowhere
has it been oftener or more vigorously
employed than by the central government of the Confederate States during
the Civil War. It has been invoked

continually by governors in the various states and once by a legislature
-that of Rhode Island.
The jurisdiction has been explained
and upheld quite consistently by nearly all state and federal courts, including the federal Supreme Court, and is,
perhaps, more or less clearly understood by most lawyers. It is doubtful,
however, whether a majority of laymen, including many writers, have a
clear conception of what it is all about,
and why, during a period of Martial
Rule, the familiar constitutional guaranties are, in greater or less degree,
suspended. Most citizens approve of
Martial Law, on the vague ground of
necessity, because they have confidence in their government and its
courts; but a certain amount of nonsense is spoken and written on the
subject whenever Martial Rule appears, not only by the insurrectionists
and their sympathizers, who may be
depended upon in that particular, but
likewise by persons who are presumed
to know. Among lawyers the difficulty is not that they do not believe that
the jurisdiction properly exists, but
they are not always clear on the legal
formula which establishes it.
The
maxims, Necessity knows no law;
Inter arma silent leges; salus republicae suprema lex, etc., are not very
convincing, and, like most legal maxims, require explanation to be properly applied.
It will be my attempt in this paper
to make clear some of these vague
conceptions, and to show how the summary methods involved in martial law
are entirely constitutional and just as
legal as any other acts devolving upon
the executive department, with especial reference to the executive of a
state, and of Colorado in particular.
The chief misunderstandings may
be briefly indicated. All state constitutions contain bills of rights similar to those in force in Colorado.
Most of these provisions contain lan-
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guage showing on its face that the
guaranty afforded is qualified and subject to exception in time of insurrection, but I shall first state them as
though their language purported to be
absolute and without exception. Few
of those who denounce the supposed
violation of the sacred guaranties have
ever read the guaranties, and I shall
state them as they are popularly alleged to be, assuming, as I say, that
the Colorado clauses are fairly typical
of other state constitutions.
The courts of justice shall be open
to every person (Art. II, Sec. 6).
No law shall be passed impairing
the freedom of speech; every person
shall be free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any subject
(Sec. 10).
All persons shall be bailable except
for capital offenses (Sec. 19).
The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall never be suspended (Sec.
21).
The military shall always be in
strict subordination to the civil power
(Sec. 22).
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate (Sec. 23).
The people have the right peaceably
to assemble for the common good.
(Se.c. 24).
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law (Sec. 25).
Now, it is argued, these guaranties
are laid down by the sovereign people
in their constitution, the same fundamental law which creates the office
of governor. The governor is a mere
creature of this constitution. Without
it, he has no official existence. He
has no powers whatsoever except what
that instrument gives him. He cannot override any one of its provisions
without being guilty of usurpation.
Therefore, the guaranties above set
forth being of equal dignity with those
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creating the governor and defining his
powers, not he or any other department of the state can ever abrogate
them. No necessity or emergency, no
matter what, can ever authorize the
governor or any subordinate of his to
disregard the privileges set out in this
bill of rights.
That is the argument.
Before coming to the main answer,
let me call attention to some of the
qualifying phrases I have mentioned,
in the bill of rights itself, which will
serve to make the main answer more
clear and conclusive.
"The courts of justice shall be open
to every person, and", the language
is added, "a speedy remedy afforded
for every injury."
Very good. But suppose the courts
of justice have been closed by a mob,
or, what is the same thing, the forces
of disorder have rendered their process ineffective and their protection
nil. Who will open the courts of justice?
Not the mere declaration of
section 6. It is a thing of paper and
printer's ink. If the courts are to be
opened at all, it must be by some
restorative power outside of the court
itself, and not found anywhere in the
phraseology of Article II.
The next guaranty reads: "That no
law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech."
By its very terms, this guaranty imposes a limitation on the legislative,
not the executive, department. When
the governor and his military subordinates place a ban on inflammatory
speech-making in the insurrectionary
zone, their action is wholly executive
and does not pretend to be legislative.
The habeas corpus clause, in Sec.
21, is very significant, because, just after the words "shall never be suspended", we find the phrase "unless
when in cases of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety may require it".
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Section 17, which says that the military shall always be in strict subordination to the civil power is fulfilled
by making the governor its commander-in-chief, placing it under the chief
civil magistrate of the state, for "the
civil power" means the executive department no less than the legislative
or judicial. This section clearly relates to the normal times and places
of civil peace, because in insurrectionary districts there is no civil power,
at least none that is effective, and the
military cannot be in strict subordination to the local "civil power" until
the military itself has restored and
revivified that civil power, whereupon
everyone admits that the role of the
military is over. In civil war, the
military cannot be in strict subordination to something that does not exist,
something which has been overthrown
and which the military is doing its
level best to set upright and enthrone
again, under the command of the chief
civil magistrate the governor.
The right of assembly, like the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
was also sadly qualified by the practical empire-builders who framed the
fundamental law of Colorado. They
said: "That the people have the right
peaceably to assemble for the common
good. and to apply to those invested

with the powers of government for
redress of grievances, by petition or
remonstrance".
And, as to the due process of
section, it will presently be seen
the summary methods of martial
are as much due process of law as
other executive process.

law
that
law
any

What then is Martial Law? We may
answer that crudely by saying that it
is the action of the governor in trying,
by means of the instrumentalities given him in the state constitution, to
fulfill the printary function of his oflice, by carrying out Sections 2 and 5
of Article IV.

These provide that the supreme executive power of the state shall be
vested in the governor, who shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed; and that he shall be commander-in-chief of the military forces
of the state, with power to call out
the militia to execute the laws, suppress insurrection or repel invasion.
In his specially concurring opinion
in the Milligan case, Chief Justice
Chase gave the first clear statement, or
rather suggestion, of the three kinds
of military jurisdiction under our
federal Constitution.
His classification has been adopted by practically
all American courts, text writers and
publicists, and forms the basis for the
manuals and studies of the War Department today.
Not in the language of any authority, but in my own phraseology, these
may be briefly indicated as follows:
First we have Military Law, governing persons in the military service
and camp followers. It is found in the
Acts of Congress, Articles of War,
General Orders, and Customs of the
Service. It does not apply to civilians,
either in peace or war; and its characteristic tribunal is the Court-Martial,
General, Special and Summary. It is
part of our domestic or municipal law.
Second is Military Government,
sometimes called the law of hostile occupation. This supersedes, so far as
the commander of the invading forces
deems expedient, the local law in force
before the invasion took place; and
the sanction for that part of the local
law which is allowed to govern is not
the displaced sovereignty of the invaded country, but the will of the military commander of the invader. Examples of this were the military government set up in Mexico by General
Scott in 1847; that of the belligerent
Contederate States when invaded in
the '60s; that enforced, with unnecessary rigor, by the German forces in
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Belgium during the world war; and
that of the occupied zone in Germany
from 1918 to 1920. Its sanction is the
will of the military commander under
the direction (with us) of the President. Its legal foundation is International Law. Its practices and precedents are the customs and usages of
war. Its characteristic tribunals are
the Military Commission and the Provost-Court, superior and inferior.
The third is Martial Law proper. A
more logical descriptive term is Martial Rule. It relates to domestic territory in a condition of insurrection or
invasion, when the Constitution and
its civil authorities have been rendered inoperative and powerless by the
insurrectionary or invading forces. It
is part of our domestic or municipal
law. In Colorado its foundation is
Article IV, Sections 2 and 5. Its characteristic tribunals are the Military
Commission and the Provost Court.
Its practices and precedents are borrowed from International Law, in the
usages and customs of war. Superficially, therefore, it resembles Military Government or hostile occupation.
In the Moyer case, decided in 1905
and reported in 35 Colorado, it was
argued for the petitioner that the governor could not declare Martial Law
or find or proclaim that a condition of
insurrection existed, and that that
power resided solely in the legislature; but the court, in line with the
authorities, held that these were executive functions fundamentally. Exercising the caution required of the
judicial office, they declined to say that
the state of affairs incident to the
overthrow of civil authority in San
Miguel County and the employment of
the troops by the governor to restore
and maintain order could be called
Martial Law, and confined themselves
rigidly to a decision of the case before them under our Constitution and
statutes.
In point of fact, however,
whenever an insurrection is found by

the governor to exist, for the suppression of which he sends a military
force into the field, the resultant legal
status is one of Martial Law in the
district, regardless of whether strict
or mild measures of repression are
put into effect, or whether it is called
Martial Law or something else.
Neither the governor, nor the commander of the troops, nor the proclamation or declaration of either, is
what suspends or abrogates Constitutional guaranties. Those have already
been suspended and abrogated by the
mob or other violent forces in the locality. It is mere mockery to assert
that the Constitution is in force in a
district where a mob and its leaders
hold the life and property of the citizen in the hollow of their hands. The
Constitution does have a theoretical or
potential existence there, but it is, for
the time being, a mere shadow; otherwise the civil authorities would be in
actual control. It is true that the mob
may confine its hostility to some particular class or business like the coal
industry, or to some locally unpopular
race or the devotees of a form of worship of which the mob does not approve.
Other citizens may be unmolested, but it is because the mob
has its attention and fury focused in
another direction. In those cases, the
military commander allows the civil
officers to function in the many duties
which are unobstructed by the riotous
forces; yet, as to that class, race or
industry which the civil authorities'
have shown their impotency to protect,
its constitutional rights have clearly
been torn away from it by the riotous
forces and not by the state executive.
The error into which enthusiasts for
the civil guaranties fall is that they
ignore other articles of the fundamental law, of equal dignity. There
are more things in a constitution than
the Bill of Rights. All constitutional
provisions must be construed together,
and harmonized. A workable govern-
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ment could be established without a
bill of rights, but no government could
be set up upon a bill of rights alone.
As said in the Moyer case, power must
reside somewhere. The primary duty
of a state is self-defense and self-preservation. To the executive is entrusted that duty. In times of tranquillity
people imagine that our civil government is part of the law of nature, but
the men who founded the state knew
that the maintenance and vindication
of its authority might be a serious
thing, and that the state executive is
vested with office for more basic purposes than to sign bills and pardon
criminals. Article IV entrusts to our
governor those great but necessary
powers which were entrusted to the
powerful governors of old time, when
the real role of a governor of a colony
or province was better understood, by
people generally, than it is today.
In addition to the constitutional sections above mentioned, the General Assembly has provided as follows:
Comp. L. 1921, Sec. 218:
"When riots, invasion or insurrection. in the state is made or threatened, the governor shall order the
national guard to repel or repress
the same; Provided that when the
emergency is great and time will not
permit of communication with the
governor, the commanding officer of
any portion of the national guard
stationed at the scene of trouble may
assemble his command and after taking steps to notify the governor in
the most speedy manner possible, aid
the civil authorities in suppressing
riots or insurrection, or repelling invasion".
See. 219:
"When there is in any town, city
or county a tumult, riot, mob or body
of men, acting together by force with
attempt to commit a felony or to
offer violence to persons or property,
or by force and violence to break and
resist the laws of the state, or when
such tumult, riot or mob is threatened and the fact is made to appear to
the governor, he may issue his order,
or such sheriff or mayor may issue
a call directed to any commanding

RECORD

officer of any portion of the national
guard within the limits of their jurisdiction, directing him to order his
command to appear at a time and
place designated, to aid the civil
authority to suppress such violence
and to support the law".
The next ensuing sections provide
penalties for disobeying the act, or
failing to respond to such call, provide
for the method of notifying members
of the command, etc.
These sections were enacted in the
session of 1921, and were evidently
prompted by the tramway riots which
occurred in Denver in the summer of
1920.
Section 5495, enacted
vides:

in

1914, pro-

"Whenever in the opinion of the
governor a condition of riot, insurrection or invasion exists in this
state, or in any county or counties,
city or cities, town or towns, district
or districts in this state, he shall
have the right to declare the state
or any such county or counties, etc.,
to be in a state of riot, or insurrection, or invasion, by proclamation,
and to prohibit the purchase, etc .....
of any firearms or ammunition, in
the places covered by such proclamation or in any other portions of the
state designated by him during the
time that said proclamation remains
in force".
These statutes are interesting, and
suggest some questions to which we
shall return in a moment.
We have seen that when constitutional protection is wipea out by insurrection, it becomes the governor's duty
immediately to restore it. This is ordinarily done:
(a) By sending the armed forces of
the state into the field in such numbers as may seem best to subdue the
turbulent elements and protect the citizens and industries of the district;
and
(b)
By simultaneously issuing a
proclamation of Martial Law, defining
the district wherein the governor finds
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that the civil authority has been overthrown, and publishing, for the information of everyone, the measures he
finds needful to enforce while the civil
authority is in process of reestablish.ment.
The first of these is necessary, as
there can be no Martial Law unless a
military force has been called out. The
second is not necessary, although usIf the governor
ual and advisable.
himself issues no proclamation, the
commander of his troops may; or there
may be fragmentary and supplemental
proclamations from either.
In any
event, the will of the governor, and of
the commander of the troops (with the
governor's approval, express or implied) is the law of the district during
the emergency. We have seen that the
practices and precedents to guide the
military forces are borrowed from International Law in the usages and customs of war. This is necessarily true,
because the means to be used, under
the express terms of the constitution,
are the military forces of the state,
and they are trained, equipped, organized and tactically employed as military forces, and not otherwise. The
usages of war, as recognized in International Law, are the only precedents
and standards that exist for the employment of troops. As said by Chief
Justice Taney in Luther v. Borden:
"Unquestionably, a state may use
its military power to put down an
armed insurrection, too strong to be
controlled by the civil authority.
The power is essential to the existence of every government, essential
to the preservation of order and free
institutions, and is as necessary to
the states of this Union as to any
other government ....
It was a state
of war; and the established government resorted to the rights and usages of war to maintain itself, and
to overcome the unlawful opposition".
And in Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S.,
the Federal Supreme Court, after referring to the Colorado constitution
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and supplemental statutes, authorizing
the governor to use the national guard
to suppress insurrection, "made or
threatened", says:
"That means that he shall make
the ordinary use of the soldiers to
that end".
Considering, for a moment, the acts
of the General Assembly, quoted above,
it will be apparent that they fall into
two elements; the first being merely
declaratory, so to speak, of the Constitution, and the second actually legislative in effect. I am inclined to
think that every authority purported
to be conferred on the governor by
section 218, already existed under the
constitution, that is, to order out the
national guard to repress any riot or
insurrection made or threatened, or to
authorize, by general or special order,
his ,subordinate commanders in the
National Guard to act promptly in a
local emergency, notifying him as
quickly as possible. Section 219 is
clearly declaratory, except in that part
which authorizes a sheriff or mayor
to issue a call to a local commander,
and making a response thereto obligatory. The latter is, I think, valid,
unless the governor should countermand the call or give other orders to
the local commander. The governor is
the constitutionally appointed commander-in-chief; and the legislature
cannot dictate how he shall employ
his troops. This is not only clear in
principle but established by authority.
Another point is that when the sheriff
or mayor has issued his call, he is
through. A civil officer cannot command or control a military force. That
is for its commander, and he takes
orders from and is responsible to no
one but his superior officers. In suppressing the riot, he uses his troops in
the way he thinks best to accomplish
his mission. Section 5495 is clearly
declaratory.
When insurrection is
flagrant anywhere, the governor can
regulate or prevent, by any method he
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finds necessary, the sale of arms and
ammunition in Denver, Pueblo, or elsewhere.
Nevertheless, it seems that all these
statutes are dictated by good policy,
placing the moral support of the legislature behind any governor who acts
with promptness and energy to restore
civil authority.
It of course results, from the foregoing principles, that the commanding
officer may seize and imprison anyone
whom he has reason to think is contributing to a continuance of the disorder, may direct the activities of the
sheriff or other civil authorities, or
remove them from office, may interdict meetings or the publication or
circulation of inflammatory newspapers and manifestoes, and establish
curfew regulations, etc., for the government of the disturbed area. In the
course of his tactical operations he
may destroy life and property where
necessary; in short, he may resort to
such measures, and the same sort of
measures, as would be proper if the
forces of a foreign government were
invading the district. It is here we
find the proper application of the maxims, "The safety of the republic is the
supreme law. Between armed forces
the laws are silent".
Likewise, the governor or commander may, if deemed necessary, establish
Military Commissions and Provost
Courts, to try offenses against the
rules of Martial Law and crimes and
disorders generally. These tribunals
are really in the nature of executive
committees to advise the commander
as to the truth in cases where the facts
and circumstances require a full and
fair investigation, and are usually
needed only where operations are on
a large scale.
Their findings and
sentences require approval of the convening authority, i. e. the governor or
commander, before they can be executed. The penalties imposed are, for the
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most part, in Martial Law situations,
only temporary measures of safety,
such as imprisonment during the
emergency, until the prisoner can be
tried upon the restoration of civil authority under conditions fair to the
People, expulsion from the district and
the like; but not necessarily so. They
may impose penalties for offenses
against the military regime, like disobedience to orders, breaking regulations, etc., but if the offenses are to
be punished as being against civil laws,
their trial should ordinarily await the
restoration of civil authority. In discussing this question, in the case of
the United States v. Fischer, 280 Fed.
208, arising out of disorders in Nebraska in 1922, Judge Munger said:
"Does the military power in the
occupied territory which is declared
under martial law extend to the trial
and punishment of offenders against
regulations made by the military
commander? Some cases are cited
in support of the proposition that
the military forces can do no more
than to arrest and detain offenders
against the laws of the state until
they can be delivered to the civil authorities for trial, upon the restoration of peace and order. No doubt
the commander may avail himself of
the courts as a means of trial, but
he may also institute tribunals during the emergency to deal with offenders in the district. This is especially true of offenses against the
military regulations, such as these
petitioners committed, acts which
are not offenses against the laws of
the state. . . . Can the sentence of

imprisonment by such a military
tribunal be continued after peace is
declared?
This question has not
been the subject of many reported
decisions. The power to punish serious offenses by imposition of the
death penalty is well understood,
and the lesser punishment of imprisonment for life has been sustained. It is stated that during the
Civil War such military commissions
acting under the authority of the
United States held trials and entered
judgment in more than two thousand cases, and that sentences of imprisonment for terms of years and
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for life were imposed. In cases of
serious offenses it is not doubted
that the sentence of imprisonment
may continue during the war or insurrection. If the punishment is inflicted but a few days before the establishment of peace, it would seem
absurd that sentences, otherwise
just, should at once expire. While
the necessity for crushing further
resistence may have passed, the reason for continuance of sentences
theretofore given has not ceased.
The conclusion is that . . . there is
nothing in the exertion of this power which contravenes the right of
due process of law guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United
States".
Although the governor had theretofore proclaimed the insurrection to be
over, the applications of the prisoners
for their release were denied.
Military Commissions resemble
Courts-Martial in organization and appearance and are composed of as many
officers as the tactical situation permits, not usually exceeding thirteen.
A commission of less than three would
be contrary to precedent. A judge advocate and defense counsel are provided for, and trials proceed, so far as
possible, on the principles of General
Courts-Martial.
Provost courts are
one-man tribunals, to handle more or
less petty offenses.
No case involving martial-law courts
has yet arisen in Colorado. They are
merely a detail, however, in the exercise of the admitted powers of the
commander, and are not affected by
the constitutional provisions as to bail,
jury trial, etc. A sentence under them
does not make the prisoner a convict,
although he be imprisoned in the state
penitentiary as a matter of convenience.
It follows, from what has been said,
that the civil courts have no more
right to impede or hamper the governor in discharging his duty of suppressing insurrection, than the governor has to hamper the courts in
their administration of justice in times

and places of civil peace. Both, when
so acting, act under the constitution.
The executive and the judiciary are
co-ordinate

and

independent

depart-

ments, and neither is above the other.
It is true that the governor has the
power to say whether the time or the
place is one of peace or insurrection,
and no dourt can question his finding.
It is also true that unless the governor
is in the exercise of a constitutional
duty, he is the same as any other citizen and amenable to the process of the
least court in the state.
And this
brings us to the question of procedure
in cases of habeas corpus, which are
often brought in behalf of rioters imprisoned under executive authority.
Usually the military operations have
been promptly successful to an extent
that has permitted a civil court to sit
in quiet somewhere in or near the
insurrectionary zone. Prompt application is there made on behalf of the
prisoner, alleging that he is illegally
restrained of his liberty.
At various
times during the last century, a few
courts failed to grasp the principles
involved, held that the executive department had no right to operate otherwise than under civil procedure, and
undertook to discharge the prisoner.
Wherever the executive department
stood its ground, the court's theory
was soon reduced to an absurdity. The
only officers who could enforce the
court's order were the sheriff and his
deputies, bailiff, coroner, etc., who had
already proved powerless to deal with
the local disturbances and who could
not possibly, unaided, take away the
prisoner from the military commander
and his soldiers. The only higher authority was the governor, and his was
the very authority by which the prisoner was held. If the sheriff tried to
organize a posse comitatus to give battle to the troops, he must draw his
force from the unorganized militia of
the state, all able-bodied male residents between the ages of 18 and 45,
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whose commander-in-chief is the governor, and whose paramount allegiance
is to him. The governor in a courteous communication would point out to
the court its fundamental error, and
that he could not, consistent with his
oath of office release the prisoner and
thus permit him to help keep alive the
insurrection which the governor was
so anxiously engaged in suppressing.
This very transaction took place in
Ex parte Moore, 64 N. C. 802, in disturbances created by the original Ku
Klux Klan. The Supreme Court of
that state soon afterward modified its
views in keeping with the logic of correct principles.
If a court is sitting and application
for the writ is made, not showing
clearly on its face that the prisoner is
held by proper authority, the court
should ordinarily grant the writ, to be
returnable in the usual way. The national guard commander should make
return, setting out very fully and in
courteous and respectful language the
basis and reasons for holding the petitioner. Forms for this are found in
the appendix to Davis on Military Law
and are easily adaptable to state practice. The commander should also, out
of respect for the court, produce the
prisoner, unless tactical considerations
seemed to forbid, in which case an
explanation should be included in the
return. The return showing that the
petitioner is held by the governor's
authority-in connection with the civil
disturbances, the court should, of
course, remand the prisoner. I am
told that during the Cripple Creek insurrection, a district judge, supposed
to be in* sympathy with the rioters,
undertook to discharge a military
prisoner, in the face of a proper return such as above indicated; and that
the Adjutant General, Sherman Bell,
was compelled to rise in open court
and notify the judge that he could not
and would not obey the order. If so,
he did exactly right, as there is no
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reason why the executive should back
down in the face of judicial usurpation, any more than that the judiciary
should tamely submit to executive
usurpation where no authority exists.
These delicate situations show that
bad conflicts may lurk close to the
surface; and the only way to avoid
them, among honest men, is for everyone to understand the correct principles which apply.
Time will not permit dealing with,
or even suggesting, many problems
that may arise out of Martial Rule;
but there is one of particular importance, namely, the correct theory of
liability against the governor and
those in military service during the
insurrection.
Many a mob leader
comes into court, after peace is restored, loudly complaining that his
sacred rights under the constitution
have been infringed by restraining
him. At all other times he abhors
that document. Cases may conceivably arise, of course, where the executives should be held liable; and the
ground for their liability is simply a
wanton abuse of power. In Moyer v.
Peabody, the plaintiff, president of the
Western Federation of Miners, had
been held by the military for two and
a half months during which the insurrection was flagrant. After it was
over, and Gov. Peabody's term of office had expired, Moyer sued him, his
Adjutant General Bell and Bulkley
Wells, a captain of militia, for damages for that imprisonment, taking the
position that it was wholly illegal in
any event. Judge Lewis disposed of
that contention (148 Fed. 870) upon
the grounds expressed by the state
supreme court in re Moyer in 35 Colo.,
and said:
"It would seem to be in keeping
with principle to hold the defendants
responsible by civil action for a
wanton abuse of power. In Luther
v. Borden it is said: 'No more force
... can be used than is necessary to
accomplish the object, and if the
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power is exercised for purposes of
oppression, or any injury wilfully
done to person or property, the party
by whom, or by whose order, it is
committed would undoubtedly be answerable'

.

.

.

(Judge

Lewis

con-

tinues: )
Reasonable inquiry and
care on their part, under the circumstances as they then exist, ought to
relieve them from civil responsibilt
ity."
The complaint not showing any
wanton abuse of power, he sustained
a demurrer to it. Moyer carried the
case to the Supreme Court where Mr.
Justice Holmes delivered the unanimous opinion. After sustaining the
authority of the state officials in every
particular he said:
"No doubt there are cases where
the expert on the spot may be called
upon to justify his conduct later in
court, notwithstanding the fact that
he had sole command at the time
and acted to the best of his knowledge. That is the position of a captain of a ship. But, even in that
case, great weight is given to his
determination, and the matter is to
be judged on the facts as they appeared then, and not merely in the
light of the event. When it comes
to the decision by the head of the
state upon a matter involving its
life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems
the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution
of executive process for judicial
process".
In his argument for the defendant
in Luther v. Borden, Webster very
clearly set forth the discretionary nature of the commander's martial law
authority in the following words:
"I shall only draw attention to the
subject of Martial Law, and in respect to that, instead of going back
to Martial Law as it existed in England at the time the charter of
Rhode Island was granted, I shall
merely observe that Martial Law
confers power of arrest, of summary
trial, and prompt execution, and that
when it has been proclaimed the
land becomes a camp, and the law
of the camp is the law of the land.
Mr. Justice Story defines martial
law to be the law of war, a resort

to military authority in cases where
the civil law is not sufficient; and
it confers summary power, not to
be used arbitrarily or for the gratification of personal feelings of hatred
or revenge, but for the preservation
of order and public peace. The officer clothed with it is to judge of
the degree of force that the necessity of the case may demand, and
there is no limit to this, except such
as is to be found in the nature and
character of the exigency".
Had Mr. Webster added that, on the
one hand, when used calmly, reasonably, and with the evident desire to
serve the public welfare, though great
errors of judgment may be made, much
latitude is allowed the commander in
the exercise of his authority; and on
the other hand, if an intent to use
power for personal ends, or in an oppressive manner be manifested, he is
liable to be held to account, both militarily and civilly, the outline would
be complete. The rule is that when
martial law exists, either by proclamation or otherwise, the commanding officer must use his discretion, and is
expected to come as reasonably near
to the line of justice and fair dealing
as the circumstances,' as they appear
at the time, and the information he
has or may easily obtain will permit.
The question naturally arises in any
mind as to possibilities of abuse of
power; but as stated in the Moyercase, arguments based on such possibilities are of the weakest variety; because abuse of power is always possible in any department of government. The political remedy for abuse
of power is by impeachment under
Article XIII. Under Article IV, Section 4, of the Federal Constitution the
national government guarantees to
every state a republican form of government. A permanent status of martial rule would not be republican in
form, and, if attempted, the federal
government would promptly overthrow
it. Cases of governors' exceeding their
authority are very rare, one of the few
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instances arising in West Virginia in
1921.
There the Supreme Court of
Appeals, in a series of exceedingly
well-considered cases, had upheld the
executive department in putting an
end to reigns of terror in the coal districts. A later governor, evidently
conceiving that he could enjoy the efficacy of Martial Rule, without the
expense of maintaining troops, declared Martial Law and sent only his
Adjutant General to the district to
take command of the activities of the
sheriff, his deputies and the posse
comitatus. The same judge who had
written most of the previous opinions
denied, in a clear and unanswerable
exposition of the law, the authority in
any executive to inaugurate a military
jurisdiction when he can get along
without the military itself. (88 W. Va.
713; 108 S. E. 428; 24 A.L.R. 1178).
It is worth noticing that state police
are not state troops, but are civil
police, and no martial law measures
can be predicated upon their use alone,
although under martial rule they can
be used by, and may cooperate with
the military. Martial Law is an extreme measure, and efficient local
peace officers, aided by a permanent
state police, are desirable to make the
necessities for Martial Rule as infrequent as possible.
These would be
more infrequent if the civil officers
would do their duty. As pointed out
by the, Chief Justice in the Milligan
case, the"local civil officers may even
be the allies of insurrection. More
often, they allow themselves to be
intimidated, and excuse their inaction
by claiming it is impolitic to enforce
the law or prosecute the rioters; or
they pretend to regard the disturbance
as a private quarrel in which they
should not "take sides"; meaning that
the mob is free to murder and loot to
the extent of its capacity. The victims
of its hostility must then defend themselves as best they can, and when they
do so, are often criticized by a large

section of the pulpit and press for carrying on a "private war".
The failure on the part of peace officers and prosecutors to do their duty
results in a denial to the citizen of
protection and redress under the civil
phases of the constitution; it amounts
to a usurpation by such local officers
of a discretion which is not even
lodged in the legislature but is forbidden to any department, namely, a
discretion to abandon the inhabitants,
property and industries of a given locality to the will and desires of a mob.
As they must be protected somehow,
it thus becomes necessary to send in
the troops, where they might not have
been needed if the local prosecutors
and peace officers had made a serious
attempt to carry out their duties in
the first instance; and the continual
failure of county and district officers
causes many persons to assume that
no authority is ever very effective except the military.
In conclusion, I think the most important points are:
1st. That the civil guaranties are
not suspended by the executive, but, in
theory and in fact, by the mob or insurrection that temporarily wipes out
constitutional protection.
2nd. That, in restoring the constitutional regime, the governor and his
officers use the armed forces of the
state in accordance with the customs
and usages of war, and any measures
they in good faith adopt are due
process of law.
3rd. That, when civil authority has
been restored, they can be held liable
civilly and politically, only for a
wanton or wilful abuse of power in
carrying out their functions.
It Was Catching
Nutz was arrested on a charge of
driving under the influence of liquor.
cand %alth%t mtr ft rtircmfeftdfalw.
-Denver Paper.
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Advice to the Tyro
At Last a Guide to the Trial Lawyer Appears
Some Hints on the Trial of a Lawsuit, by Rolla R. Longenecker, Foreword by
John Henry Wigmore, The Lawyers Cooperative Publishing
Company, Rochester, N. Y., 1927.

By

ALLEN MoORE, Denver Bar

as well as any other novice,
HE
in the
law,
musttyro
learn
the profession
rules of theofgame
from any available source. The young
lawyer is handicapped in the beginning by his almost complete ignorance
of practice and procedure, and this
applies most particularly to his lack
of knowledge with respect to the trial
of lawsuits. Rolla R. Longenecker, of
the Chicago Bar, in his "Some Hints
on The Trial of a Lawsuit" has written a book which will be of invaluable
assistance both to the young lawyer
in familarizing him with the practical
phases of the incidents of a lawsuit
and to-the experienced trial lawyer in
pointing out bad habits he may have
acquired and in revealing a whole new
field with respect to the behavior and
psychology of witnesses.
In a brief foreword Dean John
Henry Wigmiore of Northwestern University points out that all the applied
sciences, of which Law is one, depend
for their final operation on experience
in their application, because they deal
more or less with human nature as
their material. A lawyer deals, first,
with his own human nature, and secondly, other people's. He must, first,
study his own handling of himself in
his practice, an! secondly, study the
behavior of the judges, clients, witnesses, and other lawyers. Professor
Wigmore then laments that few lawyers have had the impulse to record,
systematize, and publish their accumulated experience in human nature, for
the benefit of their successors, stating
that they can be numbered on the
fingers of two hands, and that such a

record is a public benefit. He then
bestows high praise on Mr. Longenecker's book as follows:
"This book is a public benefit. If
only the young lawyer for whom it
is intended would not merely read
it, but believe it and master it and
act on its advice, the next generation of practitioners would achieve
in this field an appreciable stage of
real progress-that progress which
is the distinguishing privilege of the
human race."
In simple language the author has
set down the essentials to guide one
who is ambitious to become a trial
lawyer, always keeping in mind the
lawyer recently admitted to the bar.
who seeks information to prepare himself for trial work. While the work is
an outline and not exhaustive, it relates in a most practical way what to
do, rather than what not to do and
hence is entirely constructive.
The general incidents arising during
the trial are given from the time the
trial is set until the final entry of judgment and the necessary action and
motions to protect a client's rights
prenaratory to an appeal. If an appeal
is desired, are given.
The most novel feature of this helpful book is the author's division of witnesses into fourteen main groups as
follows:
The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The

Bold Types of Witnesses.
Cautious Types of Witnesses.
Evasive Types of Witnesses.
Expert Witness.
Female Witness.
Friendly Types of Witnesses.
Hostile Types of Witnesses.
Impartial Types of Witnesses.
Lying Witness.
Partisan Types of Witnesses.
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Public Officials as Witnesses.
The Timid Types of Witnesses.
The Unfortunate Types of Witnesses.
The Venal Types of Witnesses.
Each group is analyzed and defined
generally, then special types of each
are discussed under the following
plan:
"First, the witness is defined and
discriminated from other kinds.
"Second, his characteristics are
pointed out.
"Third, hints on how to control
the type of witness for eAamination
in chief are given in detail.
"Fourth, hints for the cross-examination of the types are noted."
In his preface, Mr. Longenecker
says:
"The student always profits
through study. The fluent, clever
lawyer relies too much upon his
natural talent, and with success becomes lazy.
"The ideal lawyer is a student, exercises patience, prepares for each
new conflict in court and thus increases his ability and skill, while
his clever, talented,. and lazy opponent becomes less and less clever
from lack of brain exercise."
The book is fairly packed with practical, concise, constructive suggestions
on preparation for trial; demeanor in
court of lawyer and witness; selection of the jury; the trial itself, characteristics of evidence; interviewing
witnesses before trial, examination of
witnesses; direct, cross-examination,
re-direct and re-cross; presentation of
documentary evidence; trial practice;
objections; argument; instructions;
special proceedings; verdicts and the
necessary steps to be taken after verdict, such as motion for new trial, arrest of judgment, entry of judgment
or preparation for appeal.
In the appendix, the author has incorporated the Canons of Professional
Ethics, also Canons of Judicial Ethics
of the American Bar Association with
an index of each. The book also includes an excellent index for it is the
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hope of the author that his work may
be used in the court room as well as
in the office in analyzing witnesses.
A study of Mr. Longenecker's excellent "Hints" should do much to point
the way and arouse latent talent and
prevent one from committing errors
in the trial of a lawsuit due to ignorance and lack of practice. Every tyro
in the law, and who is not a tyro,
should have a copy of this book on
his desk.
(NOTE-Suitable legal book reviews
will be gladly received by the Editors.)

NOTE!
As one of the purposes of THE
RECORD is to afford a means for free
expression by members of the bar
on subjects of benefit to the profession, and as the widest range of
opinion is desirable in order that
the different aspects of these matters may be presented, the editors
assume no responsibility for the
opinions in signed articles, the fact
of their publication indicating only
the belief of the editors that the
subject treated merits consideration
and attention.

No Lack of Provisions
"You say you were once cast away
on a desert island, entirely without
food. How did you live?"
"Oh, I happened to have an insurance policy in my pocket and I found
enough provisions on it to keep me
alive till I was rescued."

Reason to Worry!
"Now, tell me, do Frenchmen understand American slang?"
"I guess some of them do. Why
ask?"
"Well, you see, my youngest daughter is to be married in Paris, and the
Count has cabled me to come across."
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Attachments in California
By JACOB J. LiFHERMAN,
Former Trustee Denver Bar Association, Now of the Los Angeles Bar
(This is the second of a series of articles on comparisons and contrasts
between Colorado and California law and procedure.)

S

Colorado and are sent for collecomany
claims emanate from
tion to, or enforcement in, California, that an understanding of the
theory of attachments in the latter
State is not only of interest but of
vital concern to Colorado lawyers.
Instead of having attachments based
upon actions in contract plus the filing
of an affidavit showing some special
ground for attachment, as is the case
in Colorado, attachments in California
are issued in all cases in which (1) the
action is "upon a contract, express or
implied, for the direct payment of
money, where the contract is made or
is payable in this State (the State of
California), and is not secured by any
mortgage or lien upon real or personal
property, or any pledge of personal
property, or if originally so secured
such security has, without any act of
the plaintiff or the person to whom
the security was given, become valueless"; (2) where the action is "upon
a contract, express or implied, against
a defendant not residing in the State
of California, or who has departed from
the State, or who cannot after due
diligence be found within the State or
who conceals himself to avoid service
of summons"; and (3) where the action is "against a defendant, not residing in the State of California or who
has departed from the State, or who
cannot after due diligence be found
within the State, or who conceals himself to avoid service of summons to
recover a sum of money as damages,
arising from an injury to property in
this State, in consequence of negligence, fraud or other wrongful act".
Thus it will be seen that, except in
the case of actions against non-resi-

dents or those departing from the
State, etc., where the action is for
negligence, fraud or other tort, all attachments must be based upon actions
upon contract, express or implied, for
the direct payment of money. Consequently, actions for mere breach of
contract do not justify an attachment,
excepting, apparently, any action upon
a contract against a non-resident or a
defendant absconding or concealing
himself.
However, in the case of actions
against residents in the State of California where the contract is for the
direct payment of money, another requisite of the California Code of Civil
Procedure which is of considerable
embarrassment to forwarding attorneys is that condition which allows attachments only in cases where the
contract is made or is payable in the
State of California. In other words,
no attachment can be obtained in the
State of California against a resident
where the contract is made and payable outside the State of California.
Promissory notes made and payable in
Colorado, therefore, cannot be a basis
for attachment and litigants here are
therefore compelled to resort to the
ordinary law suit with the usual
chances of recovery upon execution.
Attachments are issued after the
filing of the complaint and the issuance of summons and filing of an affidavit showing that the plaintiff is entitled to the attachment and showing
the amount of indebtedness, and also
containing a statement that the attachment is not sought and that the
action is not prosecuted to hinder,
delay or defraud any creditor of the
defendant.
Before issuing the writ
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the Clerk must require a written undertaking on the part of the plaintiff
in a sum of not less than $200.00 and
not exceeding the amount claimed by
the defendant, with sufficient sureties,
to the effect that if the defendant recovers judgment, the plaintiff will pay
all costs that may be awarded to the
defendant and all damages which he
may sustain by reason of the attachment, not exceeding the sum specified
in the undertaking. Inasmuch as a
householder as well as a freeholder
may be sureties on such an undertaking, the Code provides that at any
time after the issuing of the attachment, but not later than five (5) days
after actual notice of the levy thereof,
the defendant may except to the sufficiency of the sureties. The hearing
upon such exception is had, at which
time the sureties must justify before a
Judge or County Clerk and prove their
financial responsibility upon the bond.
Where there is a failure of such justification, the writ of attachment must
be vacated by the Judge or Clerk.
In cases of debts, etc. due by others
to the defendant, the same attachment
writ is served upon such parties instead of a writ of garnishment issuing,
as in Colorado, in aid of execution or
attachment.
On occasions, certain
banks here take the position that they
will not answer the writ of attachment, or as we would call it in Colorado, the garnishment. In such case
it becomes necessary to obtain an Order of Court directing the garnishee
to appear either before the Court or a
Referee appointed for the purpose, to
be examined as to the alleged indebtedness-a laborious ind at times an
expensive procedure.
In practice the attorney for plaintiff
is required at the time of the request
for writ of attachment, to file a statement with the Clerk of the Court as
to what he proposes to attach and the
value thereof. Likewise, plaintiff or
his attorney is required to give written
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instructions to the sheriff specifying
what is to be attached.
Where a third party claims to ownthe property attached, the Code provides in cases of execution as well as
attachment, that such third party may
file a written claim verified by his
oath or that of his agent, setting out
his right to the possession of such
property, and serve same upon the
sheriff. Whereupon, it becomes the
duty of the plaintiff or the person in
whose favor the writ of attachment
or execution runs, to furnish on demand of the sheriff indemnification to
the latter against such claim in a sum
equal to double the value of the property; otherwise the sheriff is not
bound to keep the property so levied
upon.
Many unexpected third party claims
arise, particularly because of the defective status of the law of California
in relation to contracts of sale. In
Colorado, the law still provides that a
contract for sale of personal property
which retains the title in the seller is
good only between the parties to such
contract and void as to third parties,
and of course the method of protecting the seller is to make a definite
sale and take back a chattel mortgage
in statutory form and record same in
statutory manner. While California
provides for chattel mortgages, and
also specifies the form of the chattel
mortgage and requires not only that
the form be substantially in accordance with the statutory form-and shall
be acknowledged before recording, but
also requires that all of the parties
thereto shall make affidavit to the effect that such chattel mortgage is
made not for the purpose of hindering,
delaying or defrauding creditors, etc.,
yet there still persists here the recognition of the rule that a title does not
pass in property until so intended.
Consequently, instead of resorting to
the filing of chattel mortgages and
placing same of record, installment
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houses and others make a lease contract or agreement of sale upon installments, retaining the title in the
seller. This is not required to be recorded. Your purchaser, therefore,
buys at his peril and the party causing a levy of attachment or execution
to be made therefor, never knows
when a third party claim may be filed
on behalf of some holder of an installment contract, and upon the filing of
such claim it becomes necessary that
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the so-called "seller" or third party
claimant should be paid the amount of
his claim unless the attaching party
or execution creditor presents to the
sheriff within five days a verified statement that the claim of title under the
conditional sale is void for reasons
therein specified and delivers to the
officer a good and sufficient indemnity
bond which bond is made both to the
officer and seller or third party claimant.

CanadianJustice
By J. P. O'CONNELL,

Assistant District Attorney of the City and County of Denver

one George McDonald and his
Nwife
the Doris,
eveningtogether
of July with
18, 1927,
one
Frank Price, anxious to leave Canada
before being apprehended and charge-t
for having issued spurious checks, engaged the services of a taxi driver to
take them from Montreal to Rochester.
New York. When about fifty miles out
of Montreal, they killed the driver and
taking his money and the machine, fled
to the United States.
The McDonalds, travelling under the
alias of "Carter" arrived in Denver
about August 5th. While here they
spared neither storemen nor bankers
in their successful campaign to see
just how much they could raise on
They then
wholly worthless paper.
proceeded to Butte, Montana where
they were arrested by local police acting upon wires from Denver. After
being returned to Denver their real
identity was discovered from finger
prints, etc. and the Canadian autherities were notified.
In due course Canadian Authorities
arrived with extradition papers. These
were the most complete that the writer
has ever seen. Not a detail had been
overlooked and it was apparent that
no expense had been spared in prepar-

Canadian Justice thinks
ing them.
only of results. No matter how costly
the securing of detailed information,
if it is a link in the chain, the Canadian authorities see that it is secured.
The case of The King as George McDonald and Doris McDonald was called for trial on the morning of December 6, 1927 in a little town called Valley Field in the province of Quebec.
about forty miles from Montreal. It is
a French speaking community and the
trial therefore was conducted in both
French and English. Everything said
in French was translated into English
and vice versa.
A jury panel of about one hundred
had been summoned for service. These
men were selected by lot by the Sheriff
of the County. The writer was credibly informed that all juries in that
community are for conviction. Once a
man is apprehended it is almost taken
for granted by the jury that he is
guilty.
The defendants were represented by
the most able lawyers in Montreal.
They had been appointed by the Court
and although the case lasted nearly
two weeks, they received nothing for
their services. The attorney for the
Crown received $20 a day when en-
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gaged on the case. (He is allowed to
have his own private practise).
The jury selected was composed of
six Frenchmen and six Englishmen.
At the conclusion of the case both defendants were found guilty and the
Court immediately pronounced the
death sentence setting March 23rd as
the execution date.
Procedure
The procedure differed in some respects from that in our courts as did
the conduct of the case. The principal
differences noted were:
1. Selection of the jury.
2. Rule as to objections and exceptions.
3. Instructions.
4. Attitude of officials and citizens.
5. Attitude of the press.
Selection of Jury
The jurors are called one at a time
and accepted or rejected before another
juror is called. While inquiry may be
made, in this case not a question was
asked of a single juror concerning his
qualifications to sit. Under the law
the defense had a right to 20 preemptory challenges for each defendant,
giving them a total of 40. The Crown
had but 4 in all. As each juror is called however the Crown has the right
to ask him to stand aside. He then
waits until the panel has been exhausted before again being called into the
box. In the McDonald case the defense
exercised all its challenges but enough
of the panel remained so that it was
unnecessary to recall any who had
been asked to stand aside.
Objections and Exceptions
It is not necessary for the defense to
object to the admission of incompetent
or otherwise objectionable testimony
as the Crown assumes the responsibility. If such testimony is admitted it
is error regardless of failure to object.
The reason given to the writer by
Judges with whom he talked, was the
severity of the Canadian law and the

almost certainty of conviction. This
forces them to throw every possible
safe guard around the person on trial.
Instructions of the Court
The system of instructing the jury is
the same as that used in our Federal
Courts. It consists of a statement of
the law mingled with the comments of
the Court on evidence produced or the
It Is
failure to produce evidence.
stated that perjured testimony does not
escape the trained mind of the judge
as it does the jurors in so many cases.
Attitude of Officials and Citizens
In the many courts visited by the
writer he saw none of the maudlin
sympathy toward the defendant on the
part of citizens or court attendants
that is found so often here. Inquiry
showed that any act on the part of an
official which would tend to create sympathy for the defendant met with the
Court's disapproval at once. In the
McDonald case the mere putting of an
arm on defendant's shoulder caused the
removal of the Matron in charge of the
woman prisoner.
Attitude of the Press
The cases in the province of Quebec
are tried in the court room and not in
the Newspapers. All that the papers
print is the testimony given and not
the views of the editors upon the guilt
or innocence of the accused. The judges
by use of contempt proceedings control
the conduct of the papers and are thus
enabled to see that real justice is
meted out.
The cost of the case of Crown vs. McDonald, including capture, extradition
and trial, was $60,000. The utter disregard of expense, the surety of punishment and the absolute certainty
that the verdict will not be interfered
with by pardoning boards undoubtedly
account for the low crime rate in Canada.
(NOTE-Mr. O'Connell was taken to
Canada as a witness in this case).
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Committee Reports
Professional Ethics
HE Committee on Professional
Ethics reports the following
statements of questions submitted to it in respect of professional
conduct and its opinions thereon:
A.
Statement
An attorney has been appointed
by the Court to represent a nonresident defendant in a divorce action, the grounds being desertion.
The attorney notified the defendant
and asked her whether she intended
to contest the action. In reply the
defendant stated that it was impossible for her to live with the plaintiff, but that she was desirous of receiving some contribution from the
husband for the support of their son.
She also states that she does not
care to submit to the jurisdiction of
the Colorado Courts for the reason
that the plaintiff might seek the custody of their son. The attorney has
attempted to induce the plaintiff to
enter into a stipulation which may
be filed in Court providing that he
will pay a certain amount monthly
for the support of his son. The
plaintiff has refused to do this. The
last letter which the attorney wrote
to the defendant was some six
months ago, but the defendant has
not answered.
In view of the foregoing facts,
would it be a breach of duty on the
part of the attorney to allow the
plaintiff to proceed with his action
for divorce without raising the question of the support money and without further notifying the defendant,
or informing the Court?
Opinion
The attorney appointed by the
court has not authority to appear for

the defendant. His duty is confined
to conducting the hearing for the defendant, cross-examining plaintiff's
witnesses and securing a fair and
impartial hearing. From his statement, In the opinion of the Committee, he has no authority to urge the
matter of support but should make
known the whole situation to the
court. It is, also, a part of his duty
to inform the defendant of the situation and the possible consequences
of her failure to appear.
B.
Statement
I am informed and believe the information to be correct that at a recent divorce trial in the Denver District Court, one of the lawyers for
the defendant, the husband, made an
opening statement, which he apparently believed would arouse the anger of the plaintiff, who was the wife
of the defendant, his client. As this
counsel for the defendant finished
his opening statement, he passed behind the plaintiff, who was seated
behind her counsel, and leaning
down close to her, said in subdued
tones, "Did that get your shanty
Irish up?" Personally, I think this
is more a matter for the Grievance
Committee than for your Committee.
but as it happens so often, I doubt
that the attorney for the plaintiff
who heard these remarks would care
to take any action. For that reason,
I submit it to you and in the event
your Committee is of the opinion
that this conduct is unethical, I suggest that the opinion be published in
the Record as heretofore.
Opinion
The Committee cannot criticize
what the attorney said in his opening statement since it does not know
what was said. If it referred to mat-
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ters competent, relevant and material to the issues of the case it is immaterial whether it would make or
was intended to make the plaintiff
angry; otherwise it is contrary to
Canon 18. But in the opinion of the
Committee what the attorney said to
the plaintiff was, unless to be excused or explained by something
which does not appear, unethical in
the extreme.
C.
The President of the Association
has requested the opinion of the
Committee with regard to the pro-

priety of publication in a newspaper
of a simple professional card.
Opinion
There is nothing objectionable in
the opinion of the Committee in a
card bearing no more than name,
profession, office address and telephone number. The publication of
such a card is a matter of personal
taste but is not per se improper.
Canon 27.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARi) D. UPHAMN, Chairman,
For the Committee.

Recent Trial Court Decisions
(Editor's Note.-It Is intended in
each issue of the Record to note interesting current decisions of all local
Trial Courts, Including the United
States District Court, State District
Courts. the County Court, and the Justice Courts. The co-operation of the
members of the Bar is solicited In makIng this department a success. Any attorney having knowledge of such a
decision is requested to phone or mail
the title of the case to Victor Arthur
Miller, who will digest the decision for
this department. The names of the
Courts having no material for the current month will be omitted, due to
lack of space.)
Central Electric Supply Company,
Plaintiff, vs. The Cosmopolitan
Hotel and Broadway Theatre Company, et al, Defendants, No. 95339,
Division 4, District Court, City
and County of Denver.
Facts: Colburn on and prior to December 1, 1924 was owner of contract
for purchase of real estate consisting
of Metropole Hotel and Broadway
Theatre building and ground upon
which same situate and land adjoining
same on North. Under date of Decem-

ber 1, 1924, previous owner of said
property executed deed of the property
to Colburn and Colburn executed trust
deed on said property for $350,000.00
payable to the previous owner and also
mortgage securing $1,750,000.00 bonds
on said property. Under date of December 2, 1924, Colburn executed conveyance of said property to Hotel Company, subject to said encumbrances.
December 11, 1924, additional money
on purchase price was paid, part being
paid by Hotel Company and part by
Mortgage Company, which made the
$1,750,000.00 loan, and all of said deeds
and encumbrances were placed in escrow to be delivered on payment of
$200,000.00. December 11, 1924, Hotel
Company took possession of property
and operated Metropole Hotel. January
5, 1925, work of excavation for building of hotel building on ground to
north of old building was commenced
and thereafter work of building such
hotel building and altering old building was continued until completion.
January 29, 1925, the Mortgage Compauy paid $200,000.00 additional on
purchase price of property and said
deeds and encumbrances were deliver-
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February 7, 1925,
,d and recorded.
Mortgage Company paid the $350,000.00
first encumbrance securing unpaid balance of purchase price and the encumbrance was released. The proceeds of
the $1,750,000.00 loan were used in part
for payment of greater part of purchase price of property, as above
stated, and in part for payment to
principal contractor and certain subcontractors of cost of construction of
new building (none of such amounts
having been paid directly by Mortgage
Company to any of the lien claimants
in question).
In suit brought to foreclose mechanic's lien claims.
Held:

For lien claimants.

Reasoning: Under Colorado statutes,
Hotel Company at time of commencement of work had an equitable title
and upon the subsequent recording of
the deeds the fee simple title acquired
by same related back to and connected
with such equitable title; that under
the Colorado statutes, the mortgage
not having been recorded prior to thE
commencement of work and all the lien
claims dating their priority from the
date of commencement of work, the
mechanic's lien claims were prior to
the mortgage, as to the land, the old
building and the new building; and
that the priority given by the statute
to mechanic's lien claims over mortgages not recorded at the time of commencement of work is not affected by
fact that the deeds and mortgages were
executed and placed in escrow prior to
the commencement of work or by the
fact that part of the money secured by
the mortgage was used to pay part of
the purchase price of the property or
to pay off the purchase price encumbrance on the property or to pay part
of the cost of erecting the new building.

In The District Court
DIVISION NO. 5
JUDGE CHARLES C. SACKMAN
Clark vs. Milliken et al No. 82716
Facts: Plaintiff sues on note signed
by defendant Company by W. B. Milliken, Manager. Note endorsed by Milliken -as individual and Jamison by Milliken, Attorney in Fact. Joint and several judgment rendered against the
Company, Milliken and Jamison. Jamison prosecutes a writ of error in Supreme Court while the Company and
Milliken stand on judgment. Execution issued against debtor of Milliken
and enough money is secured to satisfy
judgment.
Judgment although paid
was not released but was assigned to
Milliken's son. Jamison moves to have
judgment satisfied in full.
Held: Motion granted and order
entered to satisfy judgment on books
in Clerk's office.
Reasoning: Release of one or more
joint or joint and several obligors releases the others.
While Sec. 5125
Compiled Laws '21 seems to give creditor the right to release one obligor upon payment of his proportionate share
of a joint and several obligation, this
does not apply where the entire indebtedness is paid. The assignment was
a subterfuge-the payment extinguished the debt and released all other joint
obligors, leaving the party paying
more than his share to his remedy in
equity for a contribution.
If Supreme Court holds judgment
final against Jamison or if writ of
error dismissed, Milliken Is entitled to
contribution.
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In The United States District
Court

In The United States District
Court

JUDGE J. FOSTER SYMES

JUDGE J. FOSTER SYMES

In the Matter of L. Clifford Hoover
Bankrupt No. 5811

L. B. Bromfield, Receiver vs. Staley et
al No. 8525

Facts: In May 1926 the Bankrupt
agreed to lease a quarter section of
land upon which he was to plant a
crop, one third of the crop to be paid
as rent and one third to be applied on
a past indebtedness owing the Lessor
by the Bankrupt. The written lease
executed in September provided that

Facts: Complaint filed in August,
1927, Last service of process, October
24, 1927. All defendants entered into
stipulation granting time to plead.
One defendant filed motion to dismiss
in September 1927. Other defendants
filed motions to dismiss on merits before expiration of the then term of
Court. In new term Defendants filed
an Affidavit of Disqualification of
Judge setting forth bias and prejudice predicated on remarks of the
Judge in the course of prior criminal
proceedings before him in which none
of defendants were parties except
Staley against whom the proceedings
were dismissed by the Court. Affilavit
further set forth prejudice as shown
by remarks of Court in other judical
proceedings before him and the Courts
opinion in a similar case in which defendants were not parties.

two-thirds of the crop was to be paid
as rent. The instrument was executed
within four months next prior to the
adjudication of bankruptcy and was
until after bankruptcy.
The instrument was never executed or
recorded as a chattel mortgage. One
third of crops paid. Claim made for
an additional one third as secured by
not recorded

lien. It was conceded that the oral'
agreement not the written one controlled.
Held: Claim not secured by lien.

Held:

Motion denied.

Reasoning: A tenant cultivating
land for part of the crop is tenant of
owner and upon bankruptcy of tenant
owner can claim his interest regard-

Reasoning: Affidavit filed too late.
Remarks of Court in former cases
properly made from the Bench in the
course of judical proceedings do not
show bias or prejudice.

less of bankruptcy. The lease as it
was not recorded till after bankruptcy
is not a lien and amounts to nothing
more than an assignment made within
four months prior to bankruptcy. Even

New Rules

been executed and recorded
prior to the four months period it
would not control unless it complied
with the Colorado Chattel Mortgage
Act. Therefore the one-third share
claimed is an asset of the bankrupt
had it

estate.

Presiding Judge McDonough,
announces that copies of the new
District Court Rules will be
mailed to Attorneys in the course
of the next two weeks. He indicates only slight changes: the
method of case allotment and
new rules to conform with past
practice.
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The Three "Mugs"
Roscreaman's Purchase of Cow
Tipperarymen "Done"
EFORE Judge Wakely at Leix

Circuit Court, Patrick J. Brophy,
Roscrea, sued Geo. Moynihan,
Rathdowney, for £25 damages for
breach of warranty and fraudulent
misrepresentation in the sale of a cow.
Mr. A. C. Houlihan, solicitor appeared for Brophy; Mr. E. T. Ryan, solr.,
(Ryan and Son), appeared for the defence.
Having heard the evidence on both
sides at great length, judgment was
reserved to Maryborough.
In giving his decision the judge said
that this was rather a serious case.
Brophy, the plaintiff, was, he understood, a dairy-man and had a grocery
besides, and he wanted to buy a milch
cow last October. He had asked a
brother or cousin of his called John
Brophy if he knew of any man who
had a good cow. John Brophy told
him that Moynihan was a likely man
to have a suitable cow, and on the
23rd October Patk. Brophy, with John
Brophy and John Keeshan went there.
They saw the cow. Brophy and his
witnesses said that Brophy said "She
does not look very like having milk,"
and Moynihan said that she had and if
she was properly worked up and fed
she would have 15 or 16 quarts a day.
£23 was eventually agreed on as the
price, and his (judges) opinion was
that a cow that had only calved 8 days
and therefore was not at her tip-top,
to give 15 or 16 quarts in October was
rather a bargain for £23. One of the
things relied on by Brophy was that
Moynihan said the cow would give 15
quarts. Brophy also asked Moynihan
did she cleanse alright, and he said
she did; he asked was the calf all

right, and Moynihan said it was. The
facts were that the cow calved a
month before her time; that the calf
died after it was dropped and the cow
took three days to cleanse. And the
veterinary surgeon when he saw the
cow in November, found her still in a
very bad way.
"I could not understand," proceeded
Judge Wakely, "the way Moynihan and
John Brophy and Keeshan gave their
evidence. There never seemed to be
three such mugs, but it may be that
they were all lies. I never thought a
Queen's Co. man could 'do' a Tipperary man (laughter), but here, if
Brophy's story is true, a Queen's Co.
man 'did' three Tipperary men" (renewed laughter).
Brophy seemed to
be a very decent, straightforward man.
He admitted he did not ask Moynihan
how much milk the cow gave, but
Moynihan admitted he told him that
he milked the cow at dinner time, and
the milking of cows three times a day
was the best way of bringing them to
their milk. Moynihan swore that the
cow was giving five to seven quarts at
that time, that he told Brophy the cow
could be worked up to 16 quarts. He
said that the cow had an accident.
She was a cow that was either on her
fifth or sixth calf. Of course, a man
that was told that a cow had an accident, and had a premature birth a
month or so before her time, and had
retained her cleansing for three days
would not have touched the cow.
When Brophy got the cow home, the
cow was giving 7 to 9 pints a day; the
best he could get was 9, and one day
she gave 10 pints.
The Judge held that Moynihan committed a breach of warranty, and he
also held that there was fraudulent
misrepresentation.
The unfortunate
Brophy had to buy another cow. He
allowed the full amount, and gave a
decree for £25, with £6 14s. witnesses' expenses,
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Earnest Encore

English Ain't No Snap

Chemist (to motorist who had been
carried into his shop after an accident)
-"Yes, sir; you rather a bad smash,
but I managed to bring you to."
Do
Motorist-"I don't remember.
you mind bringing me two more?"Happy Mag (London)

"I once tried to teach a little Alabama boy to speak pure English,"
writes Octavus Roy Cohen. "I'll never
forget the despairing way he said to
me at the end of the thirtieth or for'Dey aren't no "ain't
tieth lesson:
you," is dey? It's "aren't you," ain't
it?' "

One of Those Big Moments

Needed Encouragement

"Are you still engaged to that homely Smith girl?"
"No, I'm not!"
"Good for you, old man. You had
my sympathy when you were. How
(lid you get out of it?"
"Married her."-Kansas City Star.

Customer: "You sold me a car about
two weeks ago."
Salesman: "How do you like it?"
Customer: "I want you to tell me
everything you said about the car all
over again. I'm getting discouraged."
-L. & N. Employes' Magazine.

Wear and Tear

A Sedative
Doctor: "Your husband
Here is
absolute quiet.
draught."
Wife: "And when do I
him?"
Doctor: "You don't give
you take it yourself."

must have
a sleeping
give it to
it to him-

All Depends
Stranger-I say, friend, at what
price do you value that cow which was
tied down the road this morning?
Farmer-Are you the tax assessor
or did you hit her with your car?Public Service Magazine.

The first thing that a Scotch baby is
taught is to learn to catch rubber balls
on the first bounce. It saves both
wear and tear on the ball and also the
floor or carpet.
-1...
.
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Every Stenographic Service
Promptly Attended to at Any Time

Reitler and Woodman
Certified Shorthand ReportersNOTARIES PUBLIC
Phone Champa 2260
Suite 416 Empire Bldg.
Denver, Colo.

RalphII B. Mayo & Company
Certified Public Accountants
Established 1914

DENVER, COLORADO

FOSTER BUILDING

Audits-Financial Investigations-Income and Estate Tax

+

Accounting-Systems

I

CHAS. L SCOTT

EDWARD WHITLEY
Taurer

Preddet

THE RECORD ABSTRACT COMPANY
725 Eighteenth Street
DENVER

Complete Abstracts of Title
To all Real Estate in

DENVER
ADAMS
and

ARAPAHOE COUNTIES

TELEPHONES MAIN 1208 AND 1209

A

good Client
MEMBERS of the Bar acting as attorneys

for estates in cases where a bank is executor or administrator find a financial institution to be a good client.
The bank's officers are experienced, understand the business in hand, are always available and appreciate the importance of legal
service. Matters of accounting, colletions,
and other business details of which counsel
are glad to be relieved are attended to by
the bank. The combination of a good lawyer and an experienced trust department
produces the best possible administration.
At each of the undersigned banks it is an
established policy that the attorney who
draws the will designating the bank in a
fiduciary capacity shall be chosen as attorney for the estate.
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK

THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
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